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INTRODUCTION
Controlling "sprawl" has become the prime directive for local land
use planners. For many, nothing exemplifies sprawl, suburbia, and
conformist consumerism quite like big box retailers, such as
Wal-Mart. A few years ago, cities and municipalities began to pass
"size-cap" ordinances aimed at keeping such stores out of their
communities, or at least mitigating their impact by limiting their retail
footprint. In addition, some communities-especially those that are
tourist destinations, historically significant, or simply have a unique
t Professor and Director of Faculty Development, Cumberland School of Law, Samford
University. Thanks to Adam Griffin, Frank Esposito, and the staff of the Case Western Reserve
Law Review for the invitation to present at a wonderful symposium and for their marvelous
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1233
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
atmosphere residents wish to preserve-are taking aim at "formula
retail stores," chain stores in other words, sometimes prohibiting them
altogether.
A previous article I co-authored pointed out that while there are
legitimate reasons to regulate big box retailers and, perhaps, to limit
chain stores, many cities were enacting size-cap ordinances to protect
existing businesses from competition.1 The economic protectionism
motivating these ordinances rendered them vulnerable to challenge
under the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine (DCCD)-the limits
on state and local regulation of interstate commerce inferred from the
2constitutional grant of power over that commerce to Congress. At the
time of its writing, the article discussed only two cases-one state,
one federal-in which DCCD challenges to local retail restrictions
had been challenged; the plaintiffs lost in both.3 Since that article's
appearance, two more cases have been decided; the results were split,
with the DCCD claim rejected in one case, but sustained in the other.
This Article revisits the issue in light of these two recent cases. In
Part I, I offer a brief synopsis of the land use restrictions at issue, as
well as a summary of the DCCD itself. The two cases are described
and the reasoning of the courts in both is critiqued in Part II. In Part
III, I speculate why even blatantly protectionist ordinances seem to be
resistant to DCCD challenges. In doing so, I draw on Richard
Schragger's recent work on the role of cities and counties in the
American "common market ' 4 as well as James Whitman's fascinating
contrast between "consumerist" and "producerist" regulation in the
U.S. and Europe. A brief conclusion, including speculation on the
future of DCCD challenges to land use restrictions, follows.
I. LAND USE RESTRICTIONS ON RETAIL STORES AND THE DORMANT
COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE: AN OVERVIEW
A. Land Use Restrictions on Retail Establishments
While there are a number of ways that local governments use land
use controls to curb or restrict growth, including the growth of retail
I Brannon P. Denning & Rachel M. Lary, Retail Store Size-Cap Ordinances and the
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 37 URB. LAW. 907 (2005).
2 See infra Part I.B.
3 Denning & Lary, supra note 1, at 942-53 (discussing the cases).
4 Richard C. Schragger, Cities, Economic Development, and the Free Trade Constitution,
94 VA. L. REv. 1091 (2008).
5 James Q. Whitman, Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law,
117 YALE L.J. 340 (2007).
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establishments, 6 I am primarily concerned with those that regulate
retail stores directly. Size-cap ordinances restrict the size of retail
establishments, usually by establishing a maximum footprint that
retail stores can occupy. Such ordinance usually target so-called "big
box" or "category killer" stores, like Wal-Mart, Home Depot, or Best
Buy, that are common to suburban areas and are usually constructed
as large boxes with large parking lots. More recent big box
ordinances eschew simple caps on store size in favor of requiring big
box stores to obtain special use permits contingent on companies
taking steps to ameliorate aesthetic and environmental concerns said
to accompany big box retailing.
Formula retail store ordinances, on the other hand, are not so
much aimed at bigness per se, but rather target homogeneity. These
ordinances often ban, or at least limit, the establishment of chain
stores, or stores whose construction and layout are done according to
a uniform, standardized "formula." Think chain restaurants like
Chili's or Applebee's, or retailers like the Gap. Communities often
ban formula retail stores from particularly unique or historic parts of a
town-parts where tourists might not want to see a Starbucks or a
Gap, or where the retailer's "formula" would detract from the historic
or aesthetic ambiance. The concern is, for example, a Pizza Hut in full
trade dress being built in the middle of Historic Williamsburg.
It should be clear from the outset that there are many legitimate
uses of land use controls, even of the sort described above. I do not
claim that all such ordinances raise constitutional concerns, nor that
all should be subject to intense judicial scrutiny. However, evidence
exists that economic protectionism motivates a substantial number of
these retail restrictions.7 Many local retailers are anxious to keep big
box and formula retail stores out of their communities, fearing the
competition those retailers would bring. Such motivations do raise
constitutional concerns; in particular the DCCD's general injunction
against state and local protectionism.
B. DCCD Implications for Retail Land Use Restrictions
The DCCD is a judge-made doctrine rooted in the belief that
power over interstate commerce was assigned to Congress by the
Constitution largely to restrain states from discriminating against or
burdening their neighbors' commerce, as occurred during the
6 Patricia E. Salkin, Municipal Regulation of Formula Businesses: Creating and
Protecting Communities, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1251 (2008).
7 Denning & Lary, supra note 1, at 912-16.
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Confederation Era. Under contemporary doctrine for non-tax cases,8
courts apply a two-tiered standard of review. Statutes that make overt
distinctions between in-state and out-of-state commerce-a statute
prohibiting the importation of a product from another state, for
example-are presumed invalid and are almost always invalidated.9
In addition, a statute may be facially neutral, but nevertheless trigger
this strict scrutiny, because it was passed with an impermissible
purpose (i.e., to discriminate against out-of-state commerce, protect
local economic interests, or both) or because, regardless of its
purpose, its effects discriminate against out-of-state commercial
actors. 10 Only if states or local governments can demonstrate a
legitimate purpose unrelated to economic protectionism and
demonstrate that to effectuate that purpose no less discriminatory
means are available will discriminatory laws be upheld.1
For truly non-discriminatory laws alleged nevertheless to burden
interstate commerce, the Court applies a deferential balancing test in
which the challenger bears the burden of showing that the burdens on
interstate commerce "clearly exceed" the "putative local benefits.' 12
Laws are rarely struck down under the so-called Pike balancing test;
therefore, determining whether a law is discriminatory comes close to
deciding the outcome of the case under the DCCD.
The DCCD's framework is easier to articulate than it is to apply.
The Supreme Court has not offered specific instructions for
indentifying or evaluating claims of an allegedly protectionist
purpose, nor has it carefully explained which effects count as
discriminatory in DCCD cases. Nor has it been entirely consistent in
the application of its case law.
13
Those complications aside, because the DCCD applies to local
governments as well as states, 14 proof of discriminatory purpose or
discriminatory effects should result in the invalidation of an
ordinance. Whatever other legitimate reasons local governments may
have for restricting entry of retail establishments into their
communities, protection of existing businesses against competition
8 Another regime controls the constitutionality of state and local taxes. See Complete
Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977). There is some overlap; for example, state and
local taxes may not discriminate against interstate commerce. Id. at 278.
9 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978).
10 See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984) ("A finding that state
legislation constitutes 'economic protectionism' may be made on the basis of either
discriminatory purpose... or discriminatory effect .... (citations omitted)).
11 See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 147 (1986).
12 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
13 For a discussion of some of these problems in the context of size-cap ordinances, see
Denning & Lary, supra note 1, at 918-37.
14 See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
1236 [Vol. 58:4
DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE LIMITS
from other businesses cannot be one of them. Early challenges,
however, were not successful, 5 though the small number of cases
(only two as of 2005) made it difficult to draw any firm conclusion
from the initial lack of success. As we will see in the next part,
DCCD challenges to retail land use controls haven't exactly flooded
the courts in the years since, but there are a couple of new cases and
the record for DCCD challenges is still decidedly mixed.
II. NEW DEVELOPMENTS
Since I first looked at this issue, courts have decided two new
cases in which DCCD challenges were lodged against a size-cap
ordinance or a chain store restriction. One was a closely watched
challenge by Wal-Mart to a local California law intended to make it
difficult for the company to put in a "superstore." In the other case,
owners wishing to sell their store to a chain pharmacy were prohibited
from doing so by a local ordinance restricting formula retail stores.
Wal-Mart lost, while the other sellers won. This part takes a close
look at these opinions' handling of the DCCD claims.
A. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock
6
In 2003, Turlock, California amended its zoning ordinances
creating three new classifications of retail uses: discount stores,
discount clubs, and discount superstores. While the discount stores
and clubs were permitted in certain areas as a conditional use,
discount superstores--defined as discount stores containing
full-service grocery departments, exceeding 100,000 square feet, and
devoting more than 5 percent of their space to non-taxable
merchandise-were prohibited in Turlock. 17
Appended to the ordinance was a preamble stating its purpose. The
preamble made numerous references to the economic harm that
discount superstores did to existing businesses. It spoke of the desire
to "promote and encourage vital neighborhood commercial districts"
and found that discount superstores would "negatively impact the
vitality and economic viability of the city's neighborhood commercial
centers by drawing sales away from traditional supermarkets located
in these centers ... ."8 The Preamble further stated that such
15 Denning & Lary, supra note 1, at 942-52 (discussing Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
v. East Hampton, 997 F. Supp. 340 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) and Coronadans Organized for Retail
Enhancements v. Coronado, 2003 WL 21363665 (Cal. Ct. App., June 13, 2003)).
16 483 F. Supp. 2d 987 (E.D. Cal. 2006).
17 Id. at 991-92.
Is Id. at 992.
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superstores do not "add any retail services currently not provided
within a community" and cause "a direct shift of dollars from existing
retailers within a community, primarily from grocery stores" with
whom they "compete directly. . . ."19 Superstores were also alleged to
contribute to blight by "affecting the viability of small-scale,
pedestrian-friendly neighborhood commercial areas ....
Wal-Mart claimed that the ordinance was passed in response to
existing grocery store owners who objected to Wal-Mart's
negotiations with the city, which began in 2002, to locate a
supercenter in Turlock.21 Wal-Mart sued the city over the ordinance
alleging, among other things, that it violated the DCCD. Specifically,
the suit alleged that the ordinance had discriminatory effects on
out-of-state businesses and was enacted with a discriminatory
purpose. The court rejected both claims.
Citing Exxon Corp. v. Maryland,22 the court noted that the
ordinance did not facially discriminate against out-of-state retailers.23
"There is no constitutional right," the judge noted, "to do business in
a retailer's optimally profitable configuration, if the resulting
operation burdens environmental, traffic-pattern, economic-viability,
and land-use-planning interests of the host municipality., 24 Further, it
concluded that Wal-Mart had demonstrated no evidence showing that
"doing business in its non-discount superstore formats is more costly
or burdensome than the expense of doing business incurred by other
discount and grocery retailers in Turlock ....
Specifically, the court held first that the ordinance did not prohibit
out-of-state retailers from locating in Turlock. 6 Second, the court was
also unmoved by the evidence that, of the three retailers having
superstore formats, none was located in California, thus suggesting
that the ordinance was crafted to impact only out-of-state interests.27
The judge merely observed that a similar argument was rejected
in Exxon.28 Third, the court concluded that "[n]o evidence is offered
'9 Id. at 993.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 994.
22 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (holding that law requiring all oil producers and refiners-none of
which were located in the state-to divest retail gas stations did not have discriminatory effects
on out-of-state interests).
23 Wal-Mart Stores, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 1012 ('This leaves the market open to all local or
foreign retailers of all local or foreign products, except in the discount superstore format.").
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1014 ("[N]o company, whether in-state or out-of-state, can establish a discount
superstore in Turlock.").
27 Id.
28 Id. Oddly, the court quoted Justice Blackmun's dissent on this point. Id.
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to show Wal-Mart's national scope and size afford it any less
purchasing power to obtain advantageous wholesale prices from in-
or out-of-state producers or suppliers of . . . products that are not
explained by market forces having nothing to do with the market
format in which Wal-Mart operates in a given community. '29 Neither
did the ordinance "increase the cost of doing business for out-of-state
businesses relative to their local competitors"; 30 "downgrade or
discriminate against any out-of-state product"; nor "have any effect
on the share of local goods compared with out-of-state goods in the
local market., 31 The ordinance, the court confidently concluded, did
not "discriminate against interstate commerce either facially or in
practical effect.
3 2
As for the allegation that passage of the ordinance was motivated
by a discriminatory purpose, the court claimed that under the DCCD
discriminatory purpose was insufficient to support invalidation of a
state or local law. The court claimed that "[i]n no Commerce Clause
case cited or disclosed by research has a statute or regulation been
invalidated solely because of the legislators' alleged discriminatory
motives. 3
3
The court's conclusion that the statute was evenhanded and had no
discriminatory effects left Wal-Mart with only a claim that the
burdens on interstate commerce "clearly exceeded" local benefits.
The ordinance survived this inquiry easily. The goals asserted, like
protecting land-use goals and the environment, were plausible
benefits, and, according to the court, there was no evidence "of any
measurable burden on interstate commerce."
34
29 Id.
30 Id. Elsewhere, the court repeated that "the Ordinance does not impose any extra cost on
out-of-state interest" because "merchants are free to operate, in discount and smaller retail
formats." Id. at 1017.
31 Id. at 1015; cf Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977)
(invalidating facially-neutral regulation prohibiting the use of state grades on closed containers
of apples and holding that the regulation discriminated in its effects by (1) raising costs of doing
business on out-of-state, but not in-state, apple growers; (2) stripping the competitive advantage
possessed by out-of-state apple growers whose state had a superior grading system that brought
premium in apple market; and (3) insidiously leveling the playing field to advantage of in-state
growers whose state lacked a state grade). For discussion of Exxon and discriminatory effects,
see Denning & Lary, supra note 1, at 929-32, 933-36.
32 Wal-Mart Stores, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 1017.
33 Id. at 1013.
34 Id. at 1020.
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B. Island Silver & Spice, Inc. v. Islamorada35
The plaintiffs in Island Silver & Spice fared better with their
DCCD challenge to a local formula retail ordinance. The Saigers,
plaintiffs in the case, had operated a 12,000 square foot retail
"tropical department store" for a number of years.36 In 2002, they
decided to close up shop and entered into a contract to sell their
property for over $2.5 million to a party who intended to replace
Island Silver & Spice with a Walgreens drug store.37
Since Walgreens fit the definition of a formula retail store, it was
subject to the restrictions placed on such stores by Islamorada's
ordinance, which meant that the business could have street level
frontage of no greater than 50 linear feet and could not exceed 2,000
square feet of floor area.38 The restrictions meant that the proposed
use was barred.
Undaunted, the plaintiffs attempted to salvage the deal by arguing
that since the Walgreens would contain a pharmacy, it fell under the
"professional services" exemption contained in the ordinance.39
Initially the Village Council agreed, voting at a public hearing that the
exemption applied.4 0 About six months later, however, the Council
reversed its decision and amended the exception so that it no longer
applied to "drug stores and other retail establishments ....,,4' After
the amendment, the permits were denied, the party purchasing the
plaintiffs' land withdrew, and the plaintiffs were stuck with a tropical
department store that no one, save formula retail operators, wished to
purchase.42 They sued, alleging the ordinance violated the DCCD.
After articulating the familiar standard of review, the judge
concluded that Islamorada's formula retail ordinance failed both
tiers.43 While conceding that the ordinance was facially neutral, the
court found that "the ordinance eliminates national retail chain stores
because they cannot operate within the strict size constraints imposed
by the ordinance." 44 The effect is that "national retail stores" like
Walgreens and Publix are kept out of Islamorada, while those
constraints do not similarly affect local businesses. 45 "A local retail
35 475 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (S.D. Fla. 2007), aff'd, 542 F.3d 844 (11 th Cir. 2008).
36 Id. at 1284.
37 Id.
38 Id. (citing Village of Islamorada Code § 30-1264 (2002)).
39 Id. at 1284-85.
40 Id. at 1285.
41 Id.
42 Id.
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pharmacy," the court pointed out, "may sell the same products as a
Walgreens Drug Store in a 14,000 square foot store, as long as it does
not use any standardized features. ' ' 6
Islamorada, moreover, could demonstrate neither a legitimate
governmental interest nor the lack of less discriminatory means to
justify the discriminatory effects. While Islamorada asserted the
ordinance was necessary to preserve its small town feel 47 and relaxed
atmosphere from the attendant disruption brought by chain stores, the
court felt that the "Village has not demonstrated that it has any small
town character to preserve" 48:
The Village of Islamorada is not uniquely relaxed or natural,
nor is there a pre-dominance of natural conditions and
characteristics over human intrusions. The Village is
currently bisected by Highway One; a busy thoroughfare
fronted by a large number of retail establishments, including
well known chain stores such as CVS Pharmacy and Ace
Hardware.... Thus, any unique character or natural relaxed
atmosphere of the Village has already been diminished.49
Instead, the judge concluded that the real reason for the enactment
of the ordinance was "to serve local business interests by preventing
competition from national chains., 50 Economic protectionism, not
preservation, was the purpose.5' As in the Wal-Mart case, there was
evidence that supported this conclusion. For example, though
"maintaining a small town atmosphere" was the purpose asserted by
the Village's Deputy Manager, the plaintiff testified that another
council member told him that the formula retail ordinance had been
enacted to keep out a McDonald's.
52
The Vice-Mayor-no doubt to the distress of Village counsel-
testified that the Council "'didn't want none of them darn chain stores
46 Id.
47 Id. at 1286 (citing testimony of Deputy Village Manager that "the only reason he was
aware of for the adoption of the [ordinance] was to keep the small town atmosphere").
48 Id. at 1291.
49 Id. (citation omitted). The CVS Pharmacy's presence in Islamorada was the result of the
conversion of an Eckerd's pharmacy, present as a nonconforming use since it predated the
ordinance, resulting from the acquisition of Eckerd's by CVS. Id. at 1285. The plaintiffs
complained about the conversion, but the official in charge of interpreting the Village Code,
including the ordinance, "determined that the transition was a continuation of the previous
nonconforming use, and therefore allowable under the Village's nonconforming use ordinance
.Id. at 1286.
50 Id. at 1291.
51 Id. at 1292 ("Thus, the purpose of the ordinance is economic protectionism, not the
legitimate goal of preserving a small town community.").
52 Id. at 1287.
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coming to town.... So the thought was how do we stop that. We
wanted to do something to prevent that."' 53 He further testified that
the professional services exemption referred to "'chain real estate
companies, you know, Century, whatever, you know, ReMax or
whatever. And there are, . .. law firms that have multiple offices
around the state or country. ,, 54 Moreover, two of the five council
members owned a restaurant and a small grocery store; both were
"within the categories protected from chain competition by the
Ordinance. 55
Even assuming that protecting Islamorada's small town feel did
motivate passage of the ordinance, the judge concluded that it
failed its purpose. First, the court noted that chain stores whose
establishment predated the ordinance abound in Islamorada.56
It also pointed out that small chain stores were permitted under
the ordinance. Further, existing nonconforming uses-including
conversions from one chain to another57--were permitted; these
"would presumably also affect the Village's character., 58 Finally,
"[r]estricting formula retail stores, while allowing other large,
non-unique structures, does not preserve a small town character., 59
The Court observed that "large, artificial, or noisy buildings, besides
chain stores and restaurants, can still interfere with the Village
atmosphere as much as they like.",60
But the court didn't stop there. It also held the ordinance failed
Pike balancing. The burden on interstate commerce-here, the failure
of the proposed sale of Island Silver & Spice to Walgreens-was
significant. The plaintiffs stood to gain $2.5 million on the sale. The
judge found the benefits, by contrast, to be "vanishingly small,"
because, despite Islamorada's assertions, it "does not have a
demonstrably unique small village character to preserve. It is a town
with no historic district, bisected by a busy thoroughfare fronted by
numerous chain stores. 61
53 Id. (quoting Village Council member Mark Gregg's statement during the Whiteco-
Interra (Walgreens) appeal hearing).
54 Id. (quoting Village Council member Mark Gregg's statement during the Whiteco-
Interra (Walgreens) appeal hearing).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 1287 n.14 ("Photographs of numerous 'formula retail' stores were introduced into
evidence by Plaintiffs, and demonstrate that U.S. Highway 1 ... accommodates many of the
same chain stores (e.g., CVS, Burger King, Outback Steakhouse, Ace Hardware, Tom Thumb,
True Value Hardware) that one might see on major thoroughfares anywhere in America.").
57 See supra note 49.




61 Id. at 1293.
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C. Some Observations on Wal-Mart and Island Silver & Spice
In the next part, I take up the question why DCCD challenges to
various retail restrictions have been both rare and relatively
unsuccessful in the courts. At the risk of getting ahead of myself, the
opinions discussed above suggest one reason: judges do not seem to
have a good grasp of the DCCD. This is understandable, because, as
noted elsewhere, the Supreme Court has not been too helpful in some
cases. 62 Even taking that into account, the reasoning of both courts
leaves much to be desired.
In the Wal-Mart case, for example, the court is correct that the
Exxon case contains language that makes it difficult to argue that an
out-of-state corporate actor is constitutionally entitled to do business
in a particular form.63 However, the court barely mentioned the Hunt
case, in which, among other things, stripping an out-of-state company
of competitive advantages and leveling the playing field in favor of
in-state competitors was held to be enough of a discriminatory effect
to warrant application of strict scrutiny.64 If the court is correct, and
Wal-Mart presented no evidence to that effect, as the court
suggested,65 then that was poor lawyering on Wal-Mart's part, as
discriminatory effects claims are, by definition, going to be very
fact-specific. Nevertheless, it does seem the court was almost
willfully blind to the fact that the only entities affected by the
anti-superstore ordinance were out-of-state corporations; no
California businesses were harmed. The effect of the law fell
completely on out-of-state entities.
The evidence of purpose behind the ordinance put forth by
Wal-Mart suggests the effects were not coincidental. It seems clear-
and the court did not really deny-that a significant purpose behind
the ordinance was the protection of existing economic interests in
Turlock-specifically local grocery stores whose low margins make
them susceptible to price competition from supercenters that also sell
groceries.66 Nor is this the case of a court having to be skeptical
whether an unguarded remark of legislation expressing a
constitutionally impermissible purpose should be imputed to the
legislative body as a whole. The ordinance stated as much on its face.
62 Denning & Lary, supra note 1, at 918.
63 Exxon Corp. v. Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 127-28 (1978).
64 Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350-51 (1977).
65 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock, 483 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1012 (E.D. Cal.
2006).
66 See id. at 991-93.
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The court sidestepped these inconvenient facts by misstating the
law and claiming that no DCCD case ever invalidated an ordinance
on purpose evidence alone. That is simply not true. The Supreme
Court, 67 lower courts, 68 and commentators 69 agree: evidence of either
discriminatory effects or discriminatory purpose is sufficient to
trigger the heightened scrutiny of the DCCD. The court also
mischaracterized Bacchus Imports and ignored other precedents in
making its erroneous statement. That the court resisted what quite
clearly is the law to avoid having to apply strict scrutiny to the
Turlock ordinance, suggests that something other than simply
unfamiliarity with the law was at work. I will return to this point
below.
In contrast to the Wal-Mart case, the judge in Island Silver & Spice
had no trouble concluding that protectionism was afoot; nor did he
doubt that such a purpose was sufficient to invalidate the ordinance.
And yet there is something rather breezy about his conclusion that the
ordinance had discriminatory effects because no chain store (which he
assumed were all out-of-state) could operate within the size limits
imposed by the ordinance.7°
Further, his application of strict scrutiny once a prima facie case of
discrimination was made out also left something to be desired. For
example, he stated flatly that Islamorada had no "small-town" quality
to be preserved, citing the facts that U.S. Highway 1 ran through the
middle of town, and that chain stores proliferated along that
highway.71 Adopting the judge's position would seem to mean that
once retail chain stores made inroads into a community, there could
67 See, e.g., Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984) ("A finding that state
legislation constitutes 'economic protectionism' may be made on the basis of either
discriminatory purpose . . . or discriminatory effect .... " (emphasis added)); Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 n.15 (1981); Hunt, 432 U.S. at 352-53; Kassel v.
Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 679 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring).
68 See, e.g., Cherry Hill Vinyeard, LLC v. Baldacci, 505 F.3d 28, 33 (lst Cir. 2007) (the
DCCD "holds that a state regulation that discriminates against interstate commerce on its face,
in purpose, or in effect is highly suspect and will be sustained only when it promotes a
legitimate state interest that cannot be achieved through any reasonable nondiscriminatory
alternative" (emphasis added)); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 495 F.3d 151, 160 (5th Cir. 2007)
("A statute violates the dormant Commerce Clause where it discriminates against interstate
commerce either facially, by purpose, or by effect." (emphasis added)).
69 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES §
5.3, at 436 (2d ed. 2002) ("[A] law will be found discriminatory either if it facially discriminates
against out-of-staters or if it is facially neutral and is deemed to have discriminatory purpose
and/or impact."); DAN T. COENEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 239-40
(2004) (discussing discriminatory purpose); I LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-6, at 1066 (3d ed. 2000) ("A finding of protectionism can flow from
either a discriminatory purpose or a protectionist effect." (emphasis added)).
70 See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
71 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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be no attempt either to arrest their proliferation or reclaim whatever
was left of the small-town feel. That the relaxed or small-town feel
had been "diminished ' 72 should not mean that its eradication could
not be halted or slowed by otherwise constitutional development
controls.
The judge was on somewhat stronger ground, however, to question
whether-given the number of chains extant in Islamorada, including
a large chain pharmacy-the formula retail store effectuated any
legitimate interest the village might have in the least discriminatory
manner possible. Why a chain pharmacy posed a particular threat, but
chain real estate agencies and law firms did not, is not obvious on its
face.73 The timing of the ordinance, and, in particular, the rather
abrupt decision of the council to reverse its earlier decision permitting
the sale under the professional services exemption, also raise
questions about the sincerity of the Council.
In the end, the judge was probably rightly suspicious of the
Council's motives. The circumstantial evidence strongly suggested
that the careful crafting of a reasonable "smart-growth" policy was
not foremost on the mind of the Islamorada city government.74
72 See text accompanying note 49 supra.
73 See Denning & Lary, supra note 1, at 924 (discussing, among factors relevant to proof
of discriminatory purpose, presence of exceptions in facially-neutral statutes that call into
question fit between means and ends).
14 After this Article was completed, but before it went to press, the Eleventh Circuit
unanimously affirmed the district court. It wrote that:
Islamorada's failure to indicate a legitimate local purpose to justify the
ordinance's discriminatory effects is sufficient to support the district court's
determination that the formula retail provision is invalid under the Dormant
Commerce Clause.... It should be noted, however, that Islamorada does not assert
that the stated purposes of the ordinance cannot be furthered by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives, such as Islamorada's existing land development
regulations.... Even under the balancing approach advocated by Islamorada, the
stipulated facts indicate that the formula retail provision's disproportionate burden
on interstate commerce, such as the effective exclusion of interstate formula retailers,
clearly outweighs any legitimate local benefits.
Island Silver & Spice, Inc. v. Islamadora, 542 F.3d 844, 848 (1 1th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
Similarly, in another case arising from Islamorada's ordinance, the Eleventh Circuit reversed a
district court's decision (apparently unreported) in favor of the Village in a suit brought by a
local retailer who had hoped to sell his property for conversion into a Starbucks. See Cachia v.
Islamorada, 542 F.3d 839 (1 1th Cir. 2008). The court reasoned:
Under the elevated scrutiny test, the burden is on the local government to show
both that the regulation is supported by a legitimate local purpose and that there are
no reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to serve that purpose. ...
[T]he district court did not fully consider, and could not consider on the record at this
stage: 1) whether the ordinance's stated interests constitute a legitimate local
purpose; 2) whether the prohibition of formula restaurants adequately serves such
purpose; or 3) whether Islamorada could demonstrate the unavailability of
nondiscriminatory alternatives, such as zoning ordinances or building codes, to fulfill
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III. WHY AREN'T DCCD CLAIMS MORE SUCCESSFUL?
The relative lack of success of DCCD claims--even where
powerful evidence of protectionism exists-raises the obvious
question, "why?, 75 In this part, I suggest two primary reasons: (1)
lower court judges' confusion about the DCCD and its proper
application, a confusion aggravated by the DCCD's own confused
path in the Supreme Court; and (2) the local nature of the regulations.
As I will explain below, local land use regulations are some of the last
bastions of "producerist" legislation in the United States. And, as
Rich Schragger points out, the fact they are enacted locally, as
opposed to at the state level, means that they are likely to receive less
judicial (and Supreme Court) scrutiny.
Together, my review of the earlier DCCD challenges, and of the
opinions in Wal-Mart and Island Silver & Spice, suggest that federal
judges do not completely understand the DCCD's framework or its
application to land use regimes-especially where the laws at issue
are facially neutral. Specifically, courts routinely resist the notion that
the same needs .... The complaint adequately states a claim for relief, and further
proceedings are necessary to develop a record upon which these issues may be
properly considered by the district court.
542 F.3d at 843-44 (citations omitted). In both cases the court of appeals agreed that the effect
of the law was to exclude out-of-state businesses from the area. See Island Silver & Spice, 542
F.3d at 846-47 ("[T]he ordinance's effective elimination of all new interstate chain retailers has
the 'practical effect of... discriminating against' interstate commerce.... The formula retail
provision is therefore subject to elevated scrutiny." (citation omitted)); Cachia, 542 F.3d at 843
("[Tihe ordinance's complete prohibition of chain restaurants sharing certain characteristics
amounts to more than the regulation of methods of operation, and serves to exclude national
chain restaurants from competition in the local market. While the ordinance does not facially
discriminate between in-state and out-of-state interests, its prohibition of restaurants operating
under the same name, trademark, menu, or style is not evenhanded in effect, and
disproportionately targets restaurants operating in interstate commerce. . . .The ordinance's
prohibition therefore imposes more than an indirect burden on interstate restaurant operations,
and has the practical effect of discriminating against interstate commerce. Accordingly, the
elevated scrutiny test applies." (citation omitted)).
75 When I first looked at this subject four years ago, I frankly assumed that the few cases I
found at the time would be followed by numerous others, given the growing popularity of
size-cap ordinances. That courts have not been flooded with such claims is probably due to the
ease with which retailers can simply move into another, less restrictive area-one, perhaps,
eager for the tax revenue and job creation occasioned by the retailer's location there. Exit
options open to retailers, and the possibility of playing counties and municipalities against one
another, has brought forth calls for regional, even statewide, planning. For an overview on
statewide and regional smart growth initiatives, see Patricia E. Salkin, Squaring the Circle on
Sprawl: What More Can We Do? Progress Towards Sustainable Land Use in the States, 16
WIDENER L.J. 787 (2007). For a skeptical take on limitations on suburban growth, see Nicole
Stelle Gamett, Suburbs as Exit, Suburbs as Entrance, 106 MICH. L. REV. 277 (2007). Ironically,
to the extent that such restrictions become centralized, the likelihood rises that courts will drop
their deference and become more inclined to apply the DCCD. See infra note 90 and
accompanying text.
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proof of protectionist purpose, standing alone, is sufficient to warrant
invalidation of a zoning ordinance; further, judges often dismiss
evidence of discriminatory effects as well. In many cases, judges
assume that Exxon stands for the proposition that state and local
governments have near-complete control over the form in which
corporations can do business within their jurisdiction. As long as laws
are facially neutral, judges will not apply strict scrutiny, even if the
burdens fall only on out-of-state entities. And Pike balancing, the
courts correctly intuit, is not much of a constraint on state or local
governments.
To be fair, a good deal of the confusion is understandable, given
the Court's lack of interest in clarifying important aspects of the
DCCD.76 How to reconcile Hunt and Exxon, for example, is
something the Court has never taken up, to the frustration of many a
federal court judge and commentator. On the other hand, failing to
cite black letter law correctly, as the judge in Wal-Mart did, where
doing so would have resulted in the application of strict scrutiny,
suggests that something other than ignorance of the law might be at
work.
In a recent article, James Q. Whitman proffered a distinction
helpful to characterizing differences between American and European
attitudes towards commerce. Whitman posited that Europeans were
inclined towards "producerist" regulations focusing "on the rights of
actors on the supply side of the market-on the rights of producers..
."77Americans, by contrast, "tend to emphasize the right of
consumers to buy goods and services at competitive prices, or the
right of consumers to warranties of quality and safety. 78 While
consumer protection laws that do the latter pose few threats to the
interests of producers, a regulatory attitude informed by the former-
by solicitude for consumers' economic interests--do "represent[] a
true menace to the producerist outlook ....
While Whitman was interested primarily in how these differences
played out when American consumerist-oriented businesses, like
Wal-Mart, ran into European producerist regulations, such as those
governing store hours or prices at which goods could be sold,8° the
76 See Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50
WM. & MARY L. REV. 417 (2008) (diagnosing the current and historic ills of the DCCD and
prescribing solutions).
77 Whitman, supra note 5, at 345.
78 Id. at 346.
79 Id. at 347.
80 See, e.g., id. at 371-83 (discussing tendency of European countries to regulate retail
pricing by regulating prices of goods and prohibiting, inter alia, the use of loss leaders to
stimulate consumption); id. at 383-94 (discussing store closing hours, square foot limitations,
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distinction is relevant to the current discussion. Local retail store
regulations, especially size-cap ordinances, are ultimately concerned
with the interests of producers, rather than consumers. Their recent
popularity marks a notable exception to the American hostility to
laws limiting consumer choice in favor of permitting "stores offering
a wide range of goods and open for maximally long hours."81 To the
extent that the laws reflect a desire to protect small existing business
owners from outside competition, such a motive is, under a
producerist regime, a "feature," not a "bug.,
82
But protectionism is protectionism under the DCCD, right? Not
exactly, argues Richard Schragger, who notes that local governments
are able to accomplish ends forbidden to states by doctrines like the
DCCD through the use of exclusionary zoning.83 Schragger writes:
Two points emerge from an examination of the interlocal
free trade regime. First, local governments, unlike states, use
land use regulations to control the flow of persons, goods,
and capital across local lines. Second, despite their often
protectionist purposes and effects, the Court tends to allow
local governments to do so. Taken together, these two
features constitute important qualifications to the
presumption of intermunicipal openness .... [Cities] cannot
use tariffs, engage in currency manipulations, or adopt
restrictive immigration policies, but they can and do use land
use as a means of regulating their borders and, to a lesser or
greater extent, their internal economies.
84
Schragger believes that the difficulties presented by the lack of any
coherent theory for the DCCD, for example, are magnified when the
and licensing requirements in Europe).
S1 Id. at 384.
82 See id. at 387. For example, in both Germany and France we still find considerable law
protecting small shopkeepers. The protection of small shopkeepers against big retailers was a
recurrent theme of early-twentieth-century economic life. Anti-chain-store legislation was
widespread everywhere in the first part of the twentieth century. As big retailers like
Woolworth's and its imitators appeared, countries all over the industrialized world, including
the United States, introduced measures intended to protect their small competitors. For an
historical perspective on the U.S. experience with chain-store legislation, see Richard C.
Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist Ideology, and the Remnants of the
Progressive Constitution, 1920-1940, 90 IOwA L. REV. 1011 (2005).
83 Schragger, supra note 4, at 1133 ("What thus emerges is a picture of the American
common market that appears to be more forgiving of local than state restrictions on the mobility
of persons, goods, and capital.").
84 Id at 1108; see also id. at 1120 ("When protectionist or anti-competitive efforts are
mediated through local land use statutes, the Court tends to tolerate them.").
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mixed-grill of theories used to justify the DCCD are employed at the
local level.85 He notes that "[t]he problem is that courts do not have a
theory of the American common market that is attuned to the
appropriate scale. Thus, the leading substantive justifications for a
robust interjurisdictional mobility ... are inconsistently applied at the
local level."86 (Of course, to those who fear widespread DCCD
challenge to local land use ordinances, judicial acquiescence in this
area is applauded.87)
Whatever the reason-doctrinal disarray, judicial ignorance of or
indifference to the law, or justifiable concern that legitimate local
purposes not be overridden by courts-the lack of a robust
application of the DCCD's principles to restrictive retail ordinances
as evidenced by the cases discussed here supplies evidence supporting
Schragger's observations. Whether this is a situation to be celebrated
as recognizing important contextual differences 88 or deplored as the
disregard of important constitutional values (a view to which I tend),
the case law suggests that it is a fact of life.
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF DCCD CHALLENGES TO LAND USE
RESTRICTIONS
Local retail restrictions enacted to protect existing businesses are
an anomaly in America's consumerist regulatory landscape, which is
primarily geared to deliver to consumers the greatest number of goods
and services possible at competitive prices. They are an echo of an
earlier, producerist-oriented economy-still quite common in
Europe-that places the interests of existing businesses and the
communities in which they reside ahead of those of customers.
Certainly at the state level, the DCCD functions as a fairly robust
check on producerist-oriented legislation that slides over into simple
economic protectionism.
Despite sometimes ample evidence of protectionist motivation,
however, plaintiffs subject to local land use restrictions on retail
establishments have been no more successful in mounting DCCD
challenges to those ordinances than when I first wrote on this subject
in 2005. It is possible that the lack of success will cause future
litigants to seek grounds other than the DCCD for invalidating these
85 Id at 1143-62. For an attempt to remedy this, see Denning, supra note 76.
86 See Schragger, supra note 4, at 1143-44.
87 See, e.g., John M. Baker & Mehmet K. Konar-Steenburg, "Drawn from Local
Knowledge... And Conformed to Local Wants ": Zoning and Incremental Reform of Dormant
Commerce Clause Doctrine, 38 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 3 (2006) (arguing that courts should not
apply the discriminatory effects prong of the DCCD in zoning cases).
88 See id.
124920081
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
ordinances, much as the lack of judicial success in mounting DCCD
challenges to state and local investment incentives for corporations
has caused subsequent plaintiffs to abandon such challenges.89
On the other hand, if easy exit options enable retailers to simply
move to the next town or county, then pressure may build for
restrictions to be enacted at the regional or state level.90 If this
happens, judicial reluctance to invalidate this common species of
local protectionism will likely disappear, and DCCD challenges might
then be more successful.
89 See Morgan L. Holcomb & Nicholas Allen Smith, The Post-Cuno Litigation
Landscape, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1157 (2008).
90 See, e.g., Kris Hudson, States Target Big-Box Stores, WALL ST. J., June 29, 2007, at
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